

Discussion 6

mixed) Find the unique Nash.

		P2		
		L	C	R
P1	T	4, 1	1, 9	3, 3
	m	2, 0	2, 6	2, 1
	B	1, 5	4, 0	4, 2

↳ Remove strictly dominated? $(\frac{1}{2}T + \frac{1}{2}B)$ dominate m
 $(\frac{1}{2}L + \frac{1}{2}C)$ dominate R.



		P2		
		L	C	
P1	T	4, 1	1, 9	(p)
	B	1, 5	4, 0	(1-p)
		(q)	(1-q)	

↳ Play T: $4q + (1-q) = q + 4(1-q) = \text{Play B.}$
 $3q + 1 = 4 - 3q$
 $6q = 3 \quad q = 1/2$

Play L: $p + 5(1-p) = 9p + 0(1-p) = \text{Play C}$
 $5 - 4p = 9p$
 $5 = 13p$
 $5/13 = p$

↳ Equilibrium: $((5/13, 0, 8/13), (1/2, 1/2, 0))$
 T m B L C R

BCS23) $\pi_i = (a - q_1 - \dots - q_n) q_i - \frac{c}{2} q_i^2$
 $\frac{\partial \pi_i}{\partial q_i} = 0 \Rightarrow q_i = \frac{a - q_2 - \dots - q_n}{c+2}$ (best response)
 Symmetry $\Rightarrow q_i = \frac{a - (n-1)q_1}{c+2} \Rightarrow q_i = \frac{a}{c+1}$ (Nash)

BCS24) $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial x} = 0 \Rightarrow x = \frac{1-c-y}{2}$ (best response)
 Symmetry $\Rightarrow x = y = \frac{1-c}{3}$ (Nash.)

Third price auction) a) Highest bid wins and pays
third highest bid. $v_1 > v_2 > \dots > v_n > 0$. Ties
split by higher bidder number. Find 2 symmetric
Nash.

$\hookrightarrow b_i = v_1$ for all i .

$\hookrightarrow b_i = v_2$ for all i .

$\hookrightarrow b_i = v_3$? No P_2 deviate.

b) Why is $b_i = v_i$ not Nash? P_2 would deviate.